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This paper is a contribution to the empirical literature on R&D cooperation. It 
explores the variables that determine a firm's R&D collaborative expenditure by 
means of a sample of Italian firms. A tobit model, adjusted for heteroscedasticity 
and non-normality (Inverse Hyperbolic Sin transformation to the dependent 
variable), is used to deal with the large number of zero responses. Size, public grants 
and innovation are found to be effective in determining the level of cooperative 
R&D expenditure. Absorptive capacity, expressed by the in-house stable R&D 
effort, also plays an important role. This is in line with the idea that internal R&D is 
required if a firm is to take advantage of the outcomes of external R&D investment. 
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 1 INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decades it has been widely recognised that investment 
in research and development is a critically important factor in driving 
innovation and economic growth. Firms have devoted considerable 
resources to R&D in order to improve their innovation trajectories and 
their technological capabilities by means of new R&D organisational 
practices and external partnerships. Cooperation has become an 
important organisational component of the innovation process 
particularly in sectors where innovation is growing in complexity, such as 
biotechnology and information technology. An increasing numbers of 
firms no longer rely exclusively on their internal R&D and have started 
collaborative relationships with a variety of partners, ranging from 
suppliers to customers and research organizations. R&D partnerships 
between firms have aroused great political and academic interest. 
National governments and the European Union have pursued research 
support policies which clearly encourage cooperative R&D projects. 
Several scholars from different disciplines, such as managerial 
literature (Contractor and Lorange, 2002), transaction cost approaches 
and industrial organization literature have investigated the determinants 
of R&D collaboration (Kleinknecht and Reijnen, 1992; Fritsch and 
Lukas, 2001; Cassiman and Veugelers 2002; Tether, 2002; Belderbos et 
al., 2004a,b).  
One of the main findings of recent research is that the objectives 
and determinants of R&D collaboration differ, depending on the type of 
R&D and partner. Several arguments have been suggested to explain the 
motivations that encourage firms to enter R&D partnerships. These fall 
into two main categories: 
knowledge spillovers: incoming and outgoing knowledge spillovers 
(D’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988). A stream of literature in industrial 
organization theory has investigated the relationships between R&D 
cooperation, R&D investment, and inter-firm knowledge flows, focusing 
particularly on the potential impact of these on R&D investment levels. 
 Incoming spillovers concern whether the firm can absorb and use 
knowledge produced by other firms. In such cases partnerships may 
allow superior learning efficiency. In these models access to 
complementary knowledge (Hite and Hesterly 2001; Aurora and 
Gambardella, 1990; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Vonortas, 1994; 
Belderbos et al., 2004,a; Miotti and Sachwald, 2003) is seen as a way to 
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efficiently absorb from the partner resources which are internally weak 
(Hagedoorn et al., 2000). Firms enter into partnerships to acquire 
information which is complementary to their internal resources or to 
repatriate comparative advantages if the partner is a foreign firm (Miotti 
and Sachwald, 2003). For Japanese firms, knowledge complementarity is 
one of the main reasons for co-operating in R&D (Sakakibara, 1997). 
According to this literature, in order to carry out innovations firms need 
complementary intangible assets, i.e. tacit knowledge and know-how, 
which are not easily acquired through market-based transactions. 
Cooperation agreements may be a useful way of mitigating these 
problems and encouraging acquisition and creation of new knowledge 
(Katsoulakos and Ulph, 1998; Caloghirou et al., 2003). 
By contrast outgoing spillovers occur when knowledge that is 
generated by the firm flows out and benefits other firms. However these 
kinds of spillovers may turn out to be problematic if a firm’s 
appropriability mechanisms are weak, with possibly serious disincentives 
on the level of investment in R&D. In such cases R&D partnerships may 
be an efficient way of internalising them (Steurs 1995; De Bondt, 1996; 
Cassiman and Veugelers 2002; Belderbos et al., 2004a; Lopez, 2008); and 
of overcoming market failures in the innovation process (D’Aspremont 
and Jacquemin, 1988; Kamien et al., 1992; De Bondt, 1996). An increase 
in the level of spillovers leads to an increase in the probability that a 
firm’s cooperation will have beneficial effects on it's efficiency and 
performance. Cincera et al. (2003), for instance, show that international 
R&D cooperation affects a firm’s productivity growth positively. Lööf, 
and Broström (2008) observe that collaboration between universities and 
firms increases the probability that firms will apply for a patent and has a 
positive impact on innovative sales. 
Cost and risk-sharing in technological projects. This second 
category sees research cooperation as a way to share risks and costs, 
which are usually high in this field, as well as to exploit economies of 
scale and scope in R&D (Sakakibara 1997; Tether, 2002). Aschhoff and 
Smidt (2008) investigate the effect of past R&D cooperation on a firm's 
current innovative performance. However, along with potential benefits, 
there might well rise problems of information appropriability. The 
literature on industrial organization has built models to explore 
incentives and the risks of R&D co-operation. This literature also focuses 
its analysis on the risks involved in co-operation, with respect to 
involuntary ‘outgoing spillovers’ to partners (Veugelers and Cassiman, 
1999). 
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Finally, several arguments have also highlighted the reasons why 
firms choose to collaborate with other firms or research institutes. The 
choice of different types of partners (e.g. customers or suppliers, 
competitors, public or private research institutions) is likely to be 
influenced by the nature of the R&D projects and by the cost of a 
particular commitment (Cassiman et al., 2005). Presumably if a firm seeks 
complementarities and know how it will prefer asymmetric partnerships. 
Conversely, if the partnership is designed to internalize outgoing 
spillovers, symmetrical partnerships may be preferred.  
This work investigates the determinants that influence the decision 
of firms to engage in cooperative research, in the case of a sample of 
Italian manufacturing firms. The econometric framework is based on the 
Tobit (1958) censored dependent variable framework, adjusted to allow 
for heteroscedasticity and non-normality of error terms, and applied to a 
data set of 1231 firms engaged in research. In order to overcome the 
inconsistencies deriving from non-normality of error terms, an Inverse 
Hyperbolic Sine (HIS) transformation to the depend variable is applied 
(Johnson, 1949; Burbidge et al., 1988). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section 
describes the data and the descriptive statistics. Section III contains the 
econometric model and the results. Section IV outlines the conclusions. 
 
2  DATA AND VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
The data used in this study are taken from the Survey of Manufacturing 
Firms (SMF), carried out by the Area Studi of Capitalia Bank (2003). The 
SMF surveyed a stratified sample of Italian firms with 11 to 500 
employees. It also included all manufacturing firms with more than 500 
employees. The data was stratified according to the number of 
employees, the sector, and the geographical location. It used the Census 
of Italian Firms as a benchmark. The SMF contains questionnaire 
information about firms' structure and behaviour, and fifteen years of 
data on their balance sheets (1989-2003). Unfortunately, access to 
longitudinal data is limited. Since only a small fraction of the 
observations overlap, only the 2001-2003 survey is used in the empirical 
application. This prevents the analysis from addressing long-term 
considerations. 
The survey contains information about the total amount of R&D 
investment and the amount of R&D investment dedicated to projects 
with external partners, such as other firms and research organizations. 
The questionnaire also supplies information on the way total R&D 
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investment is financed, i.e. venture capital, self-financing, credit, free 
grants and tax reductions. Self-financing is by far the most important and 
covers more than 80% of total R&D expenditure. In this paper firms are 
considered to be subsidised if they received free R&D grants or tax 
reductions for R&D, or both.  
There are three questions in the survey that can be used to evaluate 
the firm’s access to the credit market directly: 1) whether at the current 
market interest rate the firm wants additional credit; 2) whether the firm 
is willing to pay a higher interest rate to obtain that additional credit; 3) 
whether the firm has applied for this credit but it has been refused. If the 
firm answers “yes” to the second or third questions, it is considered to 
be credit rationed. In this work this variable is used as a proxy for firm 
financial distress. 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for R&D collaborating and 
R&D non-collaborating firms. There are a total of 1231 companies which 
invest in research, 591 of which choose to co-operate in R&D. There are 
some interesting differences between the two groups. Firms which 
collaborate are larger than non-collaborating firms in terms of number of 
employees. They also invest more in terms of private R&D per worker, 
though they have the same research/workers ratio. Although internal 
processes to acquire new technological knowledge are prevalent, external 
research partnerships represent a sizeable amount of the total (42 
percent of intramural private research expenditure). 
The capital per worker ratio is slightly larger for collaborating firms, 
which also appear to have less debts and are less credit rationed. 
Interestingly, such firms also receive more grants from the government 
for both R&D and other forms of public financial support. The 
proportion of innovating firms is slightly higher for collaborating firms, 
while the proportion of exporting firms is similar for the two groups.  
There are no differences in terms of industry classification between 
the traditional ‘supplier dominated’ (PAVITT1) and ‘specialized 
equipment suppliers’ (PAVITT3). Cooperating firms are slightly less 
‘scale-intensive’ (PAVITT2) (13 percent versus 16 percent), while they 
are somewhat more ‘science-based’ (PAVITT4) than the non-cooperating 
ones (7 percent versus 4 percent). Considering that the two groups may 
also differ in their unobservable characteristics, the evidence from table 
(1) in support of the random hypothesis is not unambiguous.  
Before proceeding further, it will be briefly described the variables 
that are considered in this work. These may influence a firm’s decision 
on whether or not to engage in R&D collaboration at a particular time. 
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The model considers a set of explanatory variables which are supported 
by previous research and empirical models. However, given the lack of 
unambiguous theoretical indications the analysis is still rather explorative.  
The variable of interest is the amount of collaborative R&D 
expenditure over the three year period. This is divided by the number of 
workers to provide a measure of the intensity of R&D collaboration 
(COLL-R&DEMP(2001-2003)). Hence, unlike many other studies, this work 
considers continuous dependent variables when exploring the relative 
importance of different factors in R&D partnerships.  
In line with the existing literature, firm size is included as an 
explanatory variable. This variable is measured as the logarithm of the 
number of employees and refers to the initial year (LogEMP(2001)). Most 
empirical studies show that that firm size is a key variable for predicting 
whether a firm will engage in cooperative R&D (Sakakibara, 1997; 
Veugelers, 1997; Bayona et al., 2001; Fritsch and Lukas, 2001; Miotti and 
Sachwald, 2003). For any given level of R&D intensity, larger firms are 
also more likely to have the absorptive capacity required to exploit the 
benefits of R&D cooperation better, and are also more likely to be 
involved in multiple technologies that may require different R&D 
partnerships. However, the relationship between firm size and R&D 
partnership is not necessarily clear. On one hand, cooperation may be 
more beneficial for small companies, as it allows them to share fixed 
research costs. On the other, the resources required for partnerships may 
be high for them. The effect of size may vary according to the partners 
and purposes of the partnership (Kleinknecht and Reijnen, 1992; Tether, 
2002). Nevertheless a firm’s absorptive capacity can be expected to be 
related to its R&D activities rather than simply to its size. 
A measure of stable R&D commitment (LogEMPR&D-EMPL(2001)), 
measured as the number of R&D personnel compared to total personnel 
at the initial period, is also considered. This supplies a proxy for a firm’s 
engagement in R&D and approximates the firm’s human capital intensity. 
Knowledge is a crucial intangible asset in R&D cooperation partnerships. 
Many studies have emphasized that in order to absorb external 
knowledge, an effective absorptive capacity of understanding and using 
this knowledge effectively is essential (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; 
Griffith et al., 2004; Bönte and Keilbach, 2005). A stable R&D structure 
has a positive influence on their propensity to cooperate in R&D projects 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Kleinknecht and Reijnen, 1992; Veugelers, 
1997; Bayona et al., 2001).  
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A firm having its own R&D department is considered a factor that 
reduces risks, while increasing the probability of finding partners 
(Kleinknecht and van Reijnen, 1992). Particularly when the level of 
spillovers is high, cooperative research is associated with higher levels of 
R&D expenditure (D’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Kamien et al., 
1992). For example, Piga and Vivarelli (2004) find that the decision to 
engage in a R&D partnership is linked to the firm’s prior choice to carry 
out its own R&D activity and Leiponen (2001) suggests that a very large 
absorptive capacity might be required in order to absorb scientific 
knowledge from universities. Fritsch and Lukas (2001) and Belderbos et 
al. (2004a) find that firms engaged in R&D cooperation tend to have a 
higher proportion of R&D employees. 
Capital intensity, expressed in logarithmic term (Log(KINT)), is 
measured as physical assets per employee, to account for the fact that 
firms in more technology-intensive sectors may have a higher propensity 
to conduct R&D collaboration than those in more labour-intensive 
sectors. This may be because capital intensive firms tend to produce 
standardized goods employing standardized technology and are less 
worried about external R&D appropriability issues.  
The model checks for the possible role of R&D subsidies by 
including a dummy variable which indicates whether the firm received 
R&D subsidies during the three year period (GRANTR&D). Market 
failures in real and financial markets offer justification for public 
support, as the return may be not sufficient to justify private investment. 
The broad consensus on the use of public support is based on the 
inefficiencies of the market. These create a gap between the private and 
social return on R&D and, as a result, less than optimal levels of research. 
This is because of incomplete appropriability of research output and 
externalities deriving from the public good nature of R&D (Nelson, 
1959; Arrow, 1962). As a result, public funding tends to have a positive 
influence on firms’ R&D spending and an indirect influence on the 
propensity to co-operate in R&D (Veugelers, 1997). Kleinknecht and 
Reijnen (1992) find that various types of government support for 
innovation increase the probability that firms cooperate in R&D.  
An export dummy (EXPORT) is included because firms that 
compete in foreign markets tend to be more innovative than others 
(Arnold and Hussinger, 2005), and hence more likely to collaborate. 
Operating in more competitive environments, exporting firms are more 
inclined to invest in research and to improve R&D strategies, including 
cooperation. There may also be an indirect effect, deriving from the 
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richer network of customers, suppliers or competitors that exporting 
firms may have access to, which may make cooperation more likely.  
Industry dummies are included among the regressors in order to 
control for potential sectoral systematic differences in cooperation. 
These are: traditional ‘supplier dominated’, ‘scale-intensive’, ‘specialized 
equipment suppliers’ and ‘science-based’ (PAVITT classification). The 
rationale for this is that there may be various technology dimensions 
such as technological opportunity, appropriability regimes, dynamic 
aspects and cumulativeness whose characteristics may vary among the 
industrial sectors. A typical claim is that the propensity to co-operate on 
R&D is higher for firms from sectors with relatively high R&D intensity.  
A binary variable which indicates the innovation status of the firms 
is also included (INNOV). The effect of this variable on collaboration is 
expected to be positive, since innovative firm normally have a higher 
level of R&D expenditure, and should thus be more inclined to form 
external partnerships (absorptive hypothesis). 
A measure of the financial constraints is also included (RATION). 
Such constraints are in general good at explaining under-investment in 
technology and in R&D expenditure. This variable provides a proxy of 
credit market efficiency. The total cost of research may vary across firms 
due to differences in the availability and cost of financial resources. 
Arguments such as risks, sunk costs and other forms of market failures 
are commonly seen as having particularly severe effects in this field. 
Financial constraints are in general good at explaining under-investment 
in research and so they may well affect the amount of cooperative R&D.  
A measure of indebtedness is also included in order to control for 
the potential of the firms to find financial sources to support the costs of 
R&D. It is expressed as the ratio of debt to banks over average value 
added (DEBT-AVRATIO). Finally, GRANTOTHER is a dummy=1 if the 
firm received other public grants. 
 
3 THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
Not all firms in the sample are engaged in R&D collaboration, so 
some observations are left censored. The presence of “zero” 
observations makes the relationship between the R&D collaboration 
variable and the independent variables more complex than it is assumed 
to be by traditional regression models. The standard tobit model (Tobin, 
1958) has typically been employed to estimate censored models. By 
assuming that an unobservable latent framework generates the data (i.e. 
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the censored data have the same distribution of errors as the uncensored 
data) the model can be written as: 
COLL i
* = Xi' β+ε i        (1) 
 Where COLLi* is the unobserved latent variable, Xi is the matrix 
of the regressors, b the parameter vector to be estimated and ei ~ N(m, 
s2 ) is the random term. 
The observed dependent variable is:  
COLL i = COLL i
* if X i
' β +ε i >0
0 otherwise
⎧ ⎨ ⎩ 
     (2) 
The model is estimated employing maximum likelihood estimation 































   (3) 
The two parts represent the traditional regression for the non-limit 
observations and the relevant probabilities for the limit observations 
respectively. Where s is the standard deviation to be estimated and Φ 
represents the cumulative density function of the standard normal 
distribution. There are two basic assumptions underlying the tobit 
model. It turns out that if the disturbance s² is either heteroscedastic or 
non-normal, then the ML estimates are inconsistent (Arabmazar and 
Schmidt, 1981, 1982).  
To check for such a possibility, a Lagrange Multiplier test on the 
basis of the homoscedastic model is applied. The number of employees 
and the researchers intensity proved to affect the variance. Since 
heteroscedasticity is detected (LR: 684.058, prob > χ2 = 0.000, Table 3), 
to overcome the inconsistency of both the standard error and the 
coefficients the maximum-likelihood specification was flexibilized by 
modelling the variance using multiplicative heteroscedasticity of the 
form:  
σ i =σ⋅ exp (zi'a)       (4) 
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where zi are the continuous variables causing heteroscedasticity and a the 
additional coefficients to be estimated. 
In addition a conditional moment test for testing the null hypothesis 
that the disturbances in the Tobit have a normal distribution (Pagan and 
Vella, 1989) casts doubt on the non-normality of the tobit residuals 
(table 3). The statistic (229.22) resulted in a Prob > χ2 = 0.000, so the 
normality assumption is clearly rejected. This is not surprising, since the 
variable COLL-R&DEMP(2001-2003) is strongly skewed by the zero values. 
In this case the logarithmic transformation may provide a solution. 
However, this is likely to create problems due to the presence of the zero 
observations, particularly if this part of the sample is central to the 
analysis. As a possible solution to non-normal error structure, Yen 
(1993) incorporates the Box-Cox transformation of the dependent 
variable in the double-hurdle-model. This implies more flexible 
parameterization and distributional assumptions than the standard tobit 
does. However, there are some drawbacks associated with the Box-Cox 
transformation. The dependent variable is strictly normal only if the 
Box-Cox transformation parameter is zero. It is also not scale-invariant, 
which means that the empirical results may be affected by the unit of 
measurement employed.  
In order to overcome the inconsistencies deriving from non-
normality of error terms, this work applies an inverse hyperbolic sine 
(IHS) transformation to the depend variable (Johnson, 1949; Burbidge et 
al., 1988). This is, in fact, an alternative transformation to the Box-Cox 
transformation.1  
The IHS transformation is scale invariant (MacKinnon and Magee, 
1990) and includes as special cases a straightforward linear 
transformation (θ=1) and the logarithmic transformation (θ→0): 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) θθθθθθ // 12/122 sinh1log iiii yyyyT −=++=     (5) 
                                                 
1  The Box-Cox transformation is defined as λ
λyyT =  where for λ→0 









and iy σ .  
The likelihood equation for the adjusted model, allowing for 
heteroscedasticity and non-normality structure of errors, can be 
expressed as:2  




































β   (6) 
 
4 ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Equation (6) is estimated for the overall amount of R&D 
collaboration per employee. Since non-normality and heteroscedasticity 
are detected only the results of the IHS heteroscedastic tobit model, 
these are reported in Table 2, while the results of the homoscedastic and 
the heteroscedastic models are reported in appendix A1. In order to 
provide a comparison the same procedure on the logarithmic 
transformation of the dependent variable is also used (results in 
appendix A.2).3  
The HIS parameter (θ) is strongly significant, supporting this 
specification. To corroborate the validity of such a model a likelihood-
ratio test has been applied to the alternative tobit and heteroscedastic 
tobit models (table 3). The IHS tobit nests the tobit model and a 
likelihood-ratio test suggests that the tobit model is too restrictive (χ2 = 
695.42 so Prob > χ2 = 0.00). The corresponding tests of HIS-tobit 
versus heteroscedastic tobit (χ2 (2) = 805.44 so Prob > χ2 = 0.00) show 
that it can be rejected, so that the less flexible models are not too 
restrictive. Thus the IHS dominates both the tobit and the 
heteroscedastic tobit, which it nests.  
                                                 
2  Applications of the IHS transformation can be found in Jensen and Yen 
(1996) and Yen and Jones (1997), Newman et al. (2003) Keelan et al. (2008). In 
this work all estimations are performed using STATA. To program the code, the 
code for a Box Cox Double Hurdle Model in STATA has been adapted. This 
code was written by Moffatt (2005) and recently applied by Keelan et al. (2008). 
3   It is worth highlighting that the results show smaller standard errors in the 
IHS heteroscedastic tobit model than do the homoscedastic and the 
heteroscedastic ones of the log dependent variable model.  
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As expected firm size has a positive and statistically strong impact 
on a firm’s decision to cooperate, whatever the kind of collaboration. 
Larger firms are more likely to have the threshold size and technical 
capability to enter R&D partnerships than small firms do.  
Similarly, in line with the idea that firms have to be engaged in their 
own research in order to be able to understand and absorb external 
research, the results indicate that researchers are important in 
determining the level of external collaboration in research. An increase in 
stable intramural R&D would result in increases in its marginal 
absorptive capacity.  
The level of capital intensity, the financial constraint variable and the 
export status do not seem to influence the decision on the level of 
cooperative R&D.  
Obtaining a R&D subsidy has a positive and highly significant effect, 
suggesting that public R&D programmes help to mitigate barriers to 
cooperation (Busom and Ribas, 2007). Public grants not for R&D 
purposes are found to exert no statistically significant influence on 
collaboration. In the same way, the financial constraint status and the 
export dummy do not seem to be correlated with R&D collaboration.  
The debt variable is negative and significant, implying that more 
indebted firms are less likely to engage in external R&D commitments. 
Innovative firms are shown to be significantly more inclined to 
collaborate in R&D projects. 
As expected, the results suggest differences among sectors in the 
attitudes to cooperation, due to the different technological trajectories. 
Traditional ‘supplier dominated’, ‘scale-intensive’ and ‘specialized 
equipment suppliers’ industries are different from ‘science based’ firms. 
Their coefficients are, in fact, negative and strongly significant. Such 
firms are likely to rely more on innovative strategies based on the 
acquisition of innovation embodied in capital goods developed by 
external suppliers. By contrast the more high-tech (PAVITT4) category 
tend to have a stronger propensity to participate in collaborative 
research.  
The hypothesis that the estimated slope coefficients of the industry 
dummies are jointly zero can thus be safely rejected at one percent 
significance, confirming that there are differences in the intensity in R&D 
collaboration among industries. To further corroborate the consistency 
of the estimation results, a constrained model excluding the PAVITT 
industry dummies has also been estimated (table 3). In all three models 
the LR test supports the more informative industry variable model 
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(14.35, 24.72, 19.86 for the tobit, heteroscedastic tobit and HIS 
heteroscedastic tobit respectively). 
It is worth recognising that if R&D subsidies are conditional on 
cooperation, there will be a positive correlation between subsidies and 
cooperation, and estimates of the effects of policy decisions will be 
inconsistent (Colombo and Garrone, 1996; Veugelers, 1997; Kaiser, 
2002). Indeed a public agency is likely to decide whether or not to award 
a public grant depending on some characteristics of the firm or project. 
However, the Italian National law N. 46/82, the most important R&D 
grant awarded to the sample of firms used in this work, does not 
specifically require the applicants to engage in innovative activities jointly 
with other partners. Nevertheless, the possible endogeneity of this 
variable is investigated by performing a Durbin–Wu–Hausman test. 
The variable GRANT is regressed on the same set of covariates, 
employing the total amount of industry grant per worker as an 
instrument that affects the potentially endogenous variable but has no 
significant effect on the COLLR&D equation. The R&D equation is then 
regressed on the same set of covariates and the residuals from the first 
stage. Exclusions are the instrument, the export and industry dummies, 
as they do not significantly affect the collaboration equation (Davidson 
and MacKinnon, 1993). Since the coefficient of residuals is highly 
insignificant, the hypothesis that GRANT is correlated with unobserved 
factors can be rejected (Table 3).  
It must be admitted that the variable researcher over employees 
might suffer from the same problem. Total R&D investments may 
increase if cooperation makes one's own R&D endowments more 
effective due to, for instance, incoming spillovers from simple 
information sharing among partners. Unfortunately the data do not allow 
one to identify a proper instrument for checking for potential 
endogeneity of R&D employees intensity. Nevertheless it is very plausible 
that the possible endogeneity problem is not too severe in this study. In 
fact the choice of such a variable, rather than R&D expenditure, was 
driven by such a worry. R&D expenditure captures differences in R&D 
equipment intensity or costs, while personnel indicates a more 
permanent component of a firm’s R&D commitment, and is possibly less 
influenced by temporary joint research programmes. Furthermore, such 
variable refers to the initial period. For these two reasons simultaneity 
may be limited. 
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5 CONCLUSION 
This paper is aimed at exploring the determinants for R&D 
cooperation in a sample of Italian manufacturing firms. From the 
methodological point of view, the study shows the importance of 
correcting for heteroscedasticity and non-normality when dealing with a 
large number of zero response data. Lagrange Multiplier and Likelihood 
ratio tests strongly support the Hyperbolic Sin Transformation 
specification employed in this work. However a limitation of this study is 
that it could not control for the duration of the cooperation. In fact, the 
data allows to observe whether or not firms are involved in R&D 
cooperation, but not when the partnerships started.  
Unlike many other studies, this work uses continuous dependent 
variables to investigate the relative importance of the factors which 
affect R&D partnerships. 
The estimation results indicate that firm size is a key variable for 
predicting whether a firm will engage in cooperative R&D. Larger firms 
are also more likely to have the absorptive capacity required to exploit 
the benefits of R&D cooperation better.  
In line with previous research, this work provides evidence that the 
existence of a stable R&D structure is relevant for research cooperation. 
This variable supplies a proxy for a firm’s absorptive capacity which is 
crucial in absorbing and utilizing extra-mural knowledge. This can be 
explained by the fact that one's own R&D department is very likely to 
reduce the risks and increase the probability of finding partners, 
particularly when the level of spillovers is high and a large absorptive 
capacity is required to absorb scientific knowledge. 
In agreement with prior expectations, the effect of the innovation 
variable on collaboration is positive. Since innovative firm normally have 
a higher level of R&D expenditure they tend to be more inclined to share 
technological knowledge with external partners.  
More indebted firms are less likely to engage in external R&D 
partnerships. This highlights the importance of a firm's financial 
structure in the dynamics of extra-mural research business commitments. 
The level of capital intensity, the financial constraint variable and the 
export status are shown to not have an influence on the decision to 
participate in cooperative R&D.  
As expected the results show significant differences among sectors 
in the attitude to cooperation. This is largely explained by the different 
technological trajectories that characterize different industries. Science-
based firms rely relatively more on external cooperation than do their 
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counterparts in the supplier dominated, scale-intensive and specialized 
equipment suppliers sectors. Traditionally these latter rely more on 
innovative strategies based both on the acquisition of innovation 
embodied in capital goods developed by external suppliers and on 
receiving information and skills. 
Finally, in terms of policy the results of this study suggest that public 
support specifically aimed at research activity plays an important and 
significant role in increasing a firm’s willingness to share its know-how. 
This is in line with theoretical considerations on market failures in real 
and financial markets. As a result public financial support tends to have a 
positive influence on a firm's R&D spending and indirectly influences the 
propensity to co-operate in R&D. By contrast public financial support 
not specifically aimed at R&D does not have a statistically significant 
influence on collaboration. 
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Descriptive statistics  
 Coll-firms obs: 591
Non-Coll-firms 
obs: 640 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Employees (2001) 181.58 600.29 129.34 328.82 
Private R&D per employee (€, triennium average) 2857.43 3875.91 2225.39 3161.43 
R&D employees over total employees (€, 2001) 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 
R&D collaboration intensity (€ per worker, triennium 
average) 1205.21 2334.25 0 0 
Fixed capital per worker (€, 2001) 51.76 65.14 46.47 47.16 
Bank credit over value added (€, triennium average) 0.64 2.11 0.76 0.84 
RATION =1 if firm is credit rationed 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24 
GRANT R&D =1 if firm receives public R&D   
incentives 0.34 0.47 0.24 0.43 
OTHER SUBSIDIES=1 if firm has received other 
types of public grants 0.2 0.4 0.14 0.35 
INNOVATION=1 if firm has innovated 0.9 0.3 0.82 0.38 
EXPORT=1 if firm has exported 0.89 0.31 0.88 0.32 
PAVITT1 0.43 0.5 0.44 0.5 
PAVITT2 0.13 0.33 0.16 0.36 
PAVITT3 0.37 0.48 0.36 0.48 













IHS Heteroscedastic Tobit: Determinants of R&D collaboration 
 
Dependent variable: 
collaborative R&D intensity  
Variables  Coef. (Std. Err.) 
LogEMP(2001)  68.2*** 18.02 
LogEMPR&D-EMPL(2001)  71.51*** 15.42 
Log(KINT)2001  14.66 17.05 
DEBT-AVRATIO  -16.73* 9.63 
RATION ( Ж)  78.93 70.07 
GRANTR&D( Ж)  147.03*** 37.94 
GRANTOTHER( Ж)  61.00 43.64 
INNOV ( Ж)  136.08*** 53.08 
EXPORT ( Ж)  -8.14 58.14 
PAVITT1( Ж)  -270.66*** 75.91 
PAVITT2 ( Ж)  -368.57*** 86.02 
PAVITT 3 ( Ж)  -263.30*** 75.89 
cons  -75.29 123.25 
 
Heteroscedastic terms    
LogEMP2001  -0.09*** 0.03 
LogEMPR&D-EMPL(2001)  0.07*** 0.03 
cons  6.82*** 0.14 
IHS term  0.003*** 0.000 
# of obs.  1231 
640 left-censored 
591 uncensored 
   
Log likelihood  -5458.088  
Test on joint significance 
of industry dummies χ2 (3)  18.43 ***  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 (***, **, *) indicate a significance level of 1%, 5%, 10%  
 (Ж) dummies 
Linear-log-form estimate: 1% change in the regressors leads to βi/100 











 Table 3: testing results   
Tests on HIS tobit:  
Lagrange multiplier test for heteroscedasticity 
H0: Homoscedasticity 
LR: 689.55 
Prob > χ2 (2)= 0.000  
Reject H0  
Conditional moments test for non-normality 
H0: Normality 
CM: 229.22  
Prob > χ2 = 0.000 
Reject H0  
Likelihood ratio test for IHS heteroscedastic tobit model: 
IHS heteroscedastic tobit versus tobit model 
LR: 695.42 
Prob > χ2 = 0.000 
Reject H0 in favour of IHS tobit 
Likelihood ratio test for IHS heteroscedastic tobit model: 
IHS heteroscedastic tobit versus heteroscedastic tobit model 
LR: 805.44 
Prob > χ2 = 0.000 
Reject H0 in favour of IHS tobit 
Tests on the PAVITT industry variable model  
Likelihood ratio test for tobit model: 
Industry variable model versus constrained model  
LR: 14.35 
Prob > χ2 = 0.002 
Reject H0 in favour of industry variable model 
Likelihood ratio test for heteroscedastic tobit model: 
Industry variable model versus constrained model 
LR: 24.72 
Prob > χ2 = 0.000 
Reject H0 in favour of industry variable model 
Likelihood ratio test for IHS heteroscedastic tobit model: 
Industry variable model versus constrained model 
LR: 19.86 
Prob > χ2 = 0.000 




Durbin–Wu–Hausman (augmented regression test) for endogeneity: 
Equation Estimated coefficient  of residuals t value 
COLL R&D  .03 0.07 
Hy: coeff. residuals = 0   
F (1, 345) = 0.01 
Prob > F = 0.942   
Since the coefficient of residuals is highly insignificant the hypothesis 
of exogeneity cannot be rejected 
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Determinants of R&D collaboration 
  
Dependent variable: 
collaborative R&D intensity 
  Homoscedastic Tobit Heteroscedastic Tobit 
Variables  Coef. (Std. Err.) Coef. (Std. Err.) 
LogEMP2001  155.22* 88.96 381.62*** 70.06 
LogEMPR&D-EMPL(2001)  421.43*** 69.33 166.91** 69.41 
Log(KAPINT)2001  -11.89 86.10 10.79 75.96 
DEBTAVRATIO  -30.74 50.26 -47.38 41.01 
RATION ( Ж)  670.92* 351.98 406.34 306.51 
GRANTR&D( Ж)  594.21*** 190.80 499.88*** 160.98 
GRANTOTHER( Ж)  223.66 227.84 301.30* 185.82 
INNOV ( Ж)  798.41*** 268.64 512.75** 232.74 
EXPORT ( Ж)  -465.10* 284.90 -553.00** 260.45 
PAVITT1( Ж)  -980.03*** 376.84 -1376.99*** 318.96 
PAVITT2 ( Ж)  -1612.14*** 428.17 -1783.29*** 351.80 
PAVITT 3 ( Ж)  -1033.39*** 380.01 -1322.38*** 318.35 
cons  227.81 617.30 -709.06 533.92 
 
Heteroscedastic terms    
  
LogEMP2001    -0.16*** 0.03 
LogEMPR&D-EMPL(2001)    0.14*** 0.02 
cons    8.82*** 0.11 
# of obs.  1231 
640 left-censored 
591 uncensored 
   
  
Log likelihood  -5860.81  -5805.80  
Test on joint significance 
of industry dummies χ2 (3)  14.42 ***  26.04***  
( Ж) dummies  











Determinants of R&D collaboration 
  
Dependent variable: 
Log of collaborative R&D intensity 
  Homoscedastic Tobit Heteroscedastic Tobit 
Variables  Coef. (Std. Err.) Coef. (Std. Err.) 
LogEMP2001  0.55*** 2.97 0.76*** 0.18 
LogEMPR&D-EMPL(2001)  0.83*** 0.15 0.76*** 0.14 
Log(KAPINT)2001  0.16 0.18 0.15 0.18 
DEBTAVRATIO  -0.18* 0.11 -0.19* 0.11 
RATION ( Ж)  0.48 0.75 0.57 0.75 
GRANTR&D( Ж)  1.35*** 0.40 1.38*** 0.40 
GRANTOTHER( Ж)  0.84* 0.48 0.88* 0.47 
INNOV ( Ж)  1.89*** 0.56 1.80*** 0.56 
EXPORT ( Ж)  0.08 0.60 0.13 0.62 
PAVITT1( Ж)  -1.70** 0.80 -1.95** 0.78 
PAVITT2 ( Ж)  -2.60*** 0.90 -2.82*** 0.88 
PAVITT 3 ( Ж)  -1.73** 0.81 -1.94** 0.79 
cons  -0.67 1.30 -1.51 1.33 
 
Heteroscedastic terms    
  
LogEMP2001    -0.09 0.03 
LogEMPR&D-EMPL(2001)    / / 
cons    2.12 0.14 
# of obs.  1231 
640 left-censored 
591 uncensored 
   
  
Log likelihood  -2322.06  -2318.15  
Test on joint significance 
of industry dummies χ2 (3)  8.36**  10.36**  
( Ж) dummies  
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